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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of HMO and for-profit HMO share on the survival of safety net
services and profitable services in hospitals. Using data from 1990-2003 and proportional hazard
models, I find that hospitals in high HMO markets started out having lower hazard of shutting down
services in 1990-1994 than those in low HMO markets, but their hazard rates increase over time. By
2000-2003, hospitals in high HMO markets ended up with higher risk of shutting down profitable
services than those in low HMO markets. Conditional on overall HMO penetration, markets with
higher for-profit share of HMOs have higher hazard of shutting down services, and the gap in
survival between high and low for-profit HMO markets is bigger in high HMO areas. Lastly, I find
that the hazard rate of shutting down profitable services is comparable among not-for-profit,
for-profit, and government hospitals, while the hazard of shutting down safety net services is the
highest in for-profit hospitals and lowest in government hospitals.
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade, the US health care system has undergone significant structural 
changes, including changes in hospital ownership, increasing competition in the HMO industry, 
and increasing for-profit presence in many health care sectors.  Perhaps the most profound 
market change is the emergence of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO).  Under the 
traditional fee-for-service payment system, hospitals can charge services based on cost and have 
little incentive to engage in cost saving practices. HMOs had adopted strategies that allowed 
them to aggressively control health care costs, including negotiating deep discounts with 
providers and restricting access to providers outside of the network (Bamezai et al 1999; Draper 
et al 2002). Hospitals responded to the explosion of HMO growth by reducing cost of operation 
(Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Bamezai et al 1999; Morrisey 2001; Shen and Melnick 2004).  
However, there is little empirical evidence on whether they achieve this cost saving at the 
expense of patient welfare.  For example, do hospitals become hesitant to adopt life-saving 
technology because its expected profit is too low in the HMO environment? Do hospitals drop 
safety net services under the financial pressure from HMO? 
While several studies have found that higher HMO presence led to a slow down of 
technology diffusion in hospitals (Cutler and McClellan 1996; Cutler and Sheiner 1997; Baker 
2001; Baker and Phibbs 2002), there has not been studies investigating whether higher HMO 
presence increase the risk of hospitals shutting down safety net services (such as substance abuse 
treatment center, emergency department).  Furthermore, despite retrenchment in the overall 
HMO penetration rate since 2000 (Figure 1), there is a growing for-profit presence in the HMO 
market (Figure 2).  Classic microeconomics framework would suggest that the profit maximizing 
for-profit HMO plans would exert even greater financial pressure on its providers than not-for-  2 
profit HMO plans.  Whether such pressure translates to hospitals dropping unprofitable services 
remains to be examined.  This study aims to fill these gaps in the literature.  In particular, I 
address the following research questions:  (1) Does higher HMO penetration increase the risk of 
shutting down specialized services in hospitals? (2) Conditional on overall HMO penetration, 
does the risk of service shut down vary by whether hospitals are operating in predominantly for-
profit HMO markets or predominantly not-for-profit HMO markets? 
I contrast the analysis between safety net services (Gaskin 1999; Zuckerman et al 2001) 
and other public health services that are relatively more profitable (Horwitz 2005).  Examples of 
safety net services include emergency department, HIV/AIDS services, substance abuse services; 
examples of public health and profitable services include maternity care, birthing room, and 
sports medicine. The two types of services allow me to contrast any possible differential exit 
pattern due to their expected profitability. Using hospital and HMO data from 1990 to 2003, I 
first compare service exit rates in hospitals operating in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
with varying degrees of HMO penetration.  I then compare the risk of hospital service exit in 
MSAs where for-profits have gained a large share of the HMO market to MSAs where not-for-
profit plans retain a substantial share of HMO enrollment. 
Shutting down specialized services in one hospital can have rippling effects in the 
community.  When a hospital shuts down a specialized service, many patients will suffer 
disruption of care as they scramble to identify the next available hospital.  This is especially 
unsettling for patients requiring multiple treatment visits such as pregnancy or substance abuse 
problems.  When safety net services are shut down, the largest impact would be felt by low-
income population in the area, as they are the major users of these services.  It also takes a toll on 
neighbor hospitals as they would have to absorb the influx of patients.  Exploring how HMO   3 
presence affects these exit decisions allow us to understand some of the pathways in which HMO 
affects patient welfare. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  I discuss the background literature in section 
2.  I describe the data sources and empirical strategy in section 3.  I present the results in section 
4, and conclude in section 5. 
 
2.  Background  
Majority of literature examining the effect of HMO on hospital behavior focused on the 
financial side of the operation (see Morrisey 2001 for a review).  In general, the literature found 
that hospitals in high HMO penetration markets tend to have slower revenue and cost growth 
than those in low HMO penetration markets.  A recent study further found that hospitals in 
predominantly for-profit HMO markets have experienced slower cost growth than those in 
predominantly not-for-profit HMO markets (Shen and Melnick 2004).  However, there is little 
evidence on whether the cost saving was achieved by shifting away from unprofitable services or 
by offering services that can attract healthier and wealthier patients.   
The conceptual effect of HMO on service offering is ambiguous (Morrisey 2001; Baker 
and Phibbs 2002).   Consider the following two competing hypotheses.  If cost can be reduced 
through economies of scale, then the financial pressure from HMO would drive hospitals to 
specialize in particular, perhaps more profitable, services.  Given the scarce resources, 
specializing in new profitable services might come at the expense of shutting down existing less 
profitable services.  On the other hand, economy of scope might be the hospital’s dominant 
strategy.  If a hospital wants to attract health plans by position itself as the one-stop care center, it 
would add services that are complementary to those it already provides and rely on economy of   4 
scope to maintain its financial position.  In this case, we would not see much difference in 
service exit rates across HMO markets. A commonly held belief is that firms in high HMO 
markets will tend to adopt new services later than firms in low HMO markets, either because the 
downward pressure from HMO lowers the expected profitability of the new service, or because 
the deterioration of overall financial positions of hospitals can no longer support investment in 
new services (Baker and Phibbs 2002).   
There is less discussion about whether and how the increasing for-profit presence in 
HMO markets would affect those service shut down decisions.  However, microeconomics 
framework usually models for-profit entities as profit maximizers while places more emphasize 
on non-monetary objectives in not-for-profit entities.  If the HMO market is predominantly for-
profit, one would expect the downward pressure on hospital revenue stream to be greater, and 
thus even slower adoption of technology that require substantial financial investment and faster 
exit rate of unprofitable services.  
The discussion of HMO’s potential effect on those service adoption and shut down 
decisions should not overlook the changing landscape of HMO activities since the late 1990s. 
The HMO industry enjoyed a period of rapid growth in the early 1990s, the explosion of growth 
was fueled by concerns of rising health care cost during that period. However, such aggressive 
strategies created a deep mistrust in consumers in the later part of the 1990s (Swartz 1999, 
Robinson 2001).  The negative portrayals of managed care plans in the media further created a 
chasm between managed care and consumers/providers, even when a consumer might not have 
felt dissatisfied with his or her own health plan (Blendon et al. 1998).  Shen and Melnick (2006) 
found that HMO and managed care plans in general have lost their cost containment ability of 
the provider market in the 21
st century.  Some of that were due to HMOs relaxing their many   5 
once restrictive network requirements and deep discounting (Draper et al 2002; Mays et al 2003, 
2004; Marquis et al 2005).  In this paper, I take into account potential differential effects of 
HMO on hospital service exit rates during different phases of HMO growth. 
The empirical literature studying the effect of HMO on service offering decisions (mainly 
studies of adoption decisions) is mixed.  Some found higher HMO market shares to be associated 
with decreased availability of technology in areas such as angioplasty (Cutler and McClellan 
1996), magnetic resonance imaging (Baker and Wheeler 1998; Baker 2001), and mid-level 
neonatal intensive care units (Baker and Phibbs 2002). Similarly, using state level managed care 
data, Cutler and Sheiner (1997) examined a wide set of technology and services that all involved 
a steep sunk cost, and found that managed care has reduced the diffusion of medical 
technologies.  On the other hand, Baker and Phibbs (2002) found that higher HMO market share 
has not slowed down the rate of adoption of most advanced high-level NICU units.  Morrisey 
(2001) discussed a working paper in which the authors found that increasing HMO penetration is 
associated with increasing admission in pediatric services among general acute hospitals.  Baker 
and Spetz (1998), examining an index of hospital technological advancement and found no HMO 
effect.  The literature to date all focused on the adoption decision of technology with a high fixed 
cost.  My study instead will focus on the other end of the spectrum—I study exit rate of services 
that do not necessarily require a substantial sunk cost.   
The discussion about the survival of hospital services also cannot ignore an important 
aspect of hospital industry: it is predominantly run by not-for-profit organizations.  While there 
is a wealth of empirical literature exploring the role of ownership in different aspects of hospital 
operation (see reviews in Sloan 2000; Shen et al 2005; Eggleston et al 2006), there have been 
few empirical studies that investigated the ownership effect on service offerings in hospitals. One   6 
hypothesis is that for-profit hospitals might respond to change in demand quicker than others 
because they have easier and quicker access to the capital market (Hirth 1999).  Earlier studies, 
examining technology adoption before the rise of HMO and prospective payment system, found 
that there were no statistically significant differences in adoption between not-for-profit and for-
profit hospitals (Sloan 2000).  A recent study, using a panel of US hospitals from 1988 to 2000, 
examined 35 services in hospitals that can be categorize into different profitability categories.  
The author found that for-profits are most likely to offer relatively profitable medical services; 
government hospitals are most likely to offer relatively unprofitable services; and nonprofits 
often fall in the middle (Horwitz 2005).  The present analysis of service shut down risks will take 
into account hospital ownership differences. 
In summary, although there is a wealth of literature examining how HMOs affect the 
financial side of hospital operation, there is less focus on understanding its effect on service 
adoption and disruption. Changing the mixture of service offered is certainly one way to improve 
the financial position of the hospital.  Few studies examine service adoption decisions and none 
on exit behaviors.   This study aims to fill the gap.  
 
3.  Empirical Methods 
Overview of Empirical Strategy 
The primary data sources for the analysis are the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
annual surveys, Hospital cost report from the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
(CMS), and the HMO enrollment and ownership data provided by Laurence Baker and 
Interstudy.  The unit of analysis is hospital and I examine the risk of service shut down between   7 
1990 and 2003.  I use proportional hazard models to analyze the effects of HMO and for-profit 
share of HMO on the hazard of hospitals shutting down safety net and profitable services.   
 
Sample and Data Sources  
The analytical sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals in metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) between 1990 and 2003.  Separate indicators of the different ownership 
structure (not-for-profit, for-profit, government, whether ownership was changed) are included in 
the analyses.  My analysis utilizes all 14 years of information with two exceptions.  Analysis of 
child wellness and AIDS services are limited to 1994-2003 period because data are not available 
before 1994.
1  I limit the sample to hospitals in MSAs because the majority of HMO enrollment 
occurred in MSAs during this period, and hospitals in rural areas behave differently from those 
in urban areas.  Lastly I exclude a handful of Kaiser Foundation hospitals since they serve 
exclusively Kaiser health plan enrollees.  This sampling frame contains about 3000 hospitals in 
322 MSA markets in each year for a total of 33000 hospital-year observations. 
Hospital Data.  Hospital data primarily come from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) Annual Surveys and Medicare hospital cost reports by CMS.  Together, they provide 
detailed information on hospitals’ financial performance, inpatient and outpatient utilization, and 
other characteristics.  I supplement hospital ownership data with those provided by Frank Sloan.
2  
Particularly important to this project are the service measures hospitals self reported to the AHA 
surveys.  I describe the services and limitations in AHA data in more details below. 
HMO Data.  HMO is one of many types of managed care plans.  Managed care plans are 
                                                 
1 The presence of child wellness service was not recorded until 1994.  The survey questions for AIDS were changed 
in 1994 in such a way that I cannot construct a consistent time series.  
2 The underlying data are still from AHA, Dr. Sloan tracked down CEO and CFO of hospitals with suspicious 
ownership change.   8 
antithesis of fee-for-service plans and are loosely defined as health plans that engage in activities 
that reduce high levels of utilization such as utilization review board and deep discounts with 
providers.  There are two practical reasons to focus on HMO.  First, it accounts for majority of 
managed care activities, especially during the 1990s.  Second, this is the only form of managed 
care plan whose enrollments were tracked consistently over the years and whose data are 
available for sufficient number of years to carry out exit analysis.  As discussed in sensitivity 
analysis later, I also experiment with using a more comprehensive managed care measure that 
includes both HMO and PPO (preferred provider organizations). I use the HMO only measure in 
my main analysis because it is more reliable. 
Overall HMO penetration rates at the MSA level between 1990 and 2003 are provided by 
Laurence Baker of Stanford University.  The HMO penetration rate is measured as total HMO 
enrollment as a share of MSA population.  The underlying data sources are from HMO Census 
conducted by the Group Health Association of America from 1990 and 1994 and by InterStudy 
from 1995 to 2003.  Detailed methodology of the smoothing between the two data sources can be 
found in Baker (1997).   
In addition, HMO ownership information between 1994 and 2003 was obtained from 
Interstudy.
3  The ownership data include detailed information about enrollment levels, ownership 
of each plan, and MSAs served by the plan.  I use this data source to construct percent HMO 
enrollment that are for-profit in each MSA between 1994 and 2003.  
Other Data. I further supplement the hospital and HMO data with other information to 
capture relevant market characteristics.  These include the area wage index from the PPS Impact 
File, population characteristics from the Area Resource File, and a variable-radius based hospital 
                                                 
3 1999 and 2002 ownership information were not available. I use the adjacent two years to interpolate the for-profit 
HMO enrollment share for those two years.   9 
competition measure (Herfindahl index) provided by Glenn Melnick.    
 
Variable Construction 
Hospital Service Variables.  I focus on services that are commonly viewed as safety net 
services as well as services that are relatively profitable.  Using Zuckerman et al (2001) as the 
blueprint, safety net services include emergency department, trauma center, HIV/AIDS services, 
inpatient substance abuse services, and outpatient substance abuse services.
4  Profitable services 
include maternity care, birthing room, child wellness service, women health center, and sports 
medicine (Horwitz 2005).  It should be noted that while maternity care is an important safety net 
service, it is considered a revenue generating service especially since a growing share of births 
were being covered by Medicaid (Zuckerman et al 2001).  Therefore I categorize maternity care 
under profitable service. 
Because service variables are obtained from AHA surveys, which are self-reported, one 
would be concerned with data reliability.  However, there is no reason to believe that reporting 
errors would be correlated with HMO penetration.  Another limitation of AHA data is that there 
are missing values over the years, especially toward the later years.  When hospitals did not 
report whether they offered a service in a given year, I impute the values using information from 
adjacent years (for example, if a hospital is missing 1992 value but report having a given service 
in 1991 and 1993, I would impute 1992 as having such a service).  If there are more than two 
consecutive missing values, no imputation is done and observations are excluded from the 
analysis.  Depending on the service, I impute 3.5-4.7% of the data.  
                                                 
4 Zuckerman et al (2001) analyze several additional safety net services such as burn unit and neonatal intensive care 
unit.  I do not include burn unit because there are too few hospitals offering this service that I do not have enough 
sample size to analyze exit behavior. I do not include neonatal intensive care unit, because such unit requires a high 
sunk cost that hospitals rarely shut it down (Baker and Phibbs 2000).  For the same reason I do not estimate the risk 
of shut down for cardiac and diagnostic imaging technology.   10 
Defining Service Adoption and Exit Years.  In order to analyze the risk of service shut 
down, I also need to track when a hospital started offering that service.  With the cleaned AHA 
data, I construct adoption and exit variables for each of the services.  I use the adoption 
definition in Baker and Phibbs (2002)—I define adoption year as the first year of the first 
consecutive pair of years in which the hospital says it offers a given service.   Using this 
definition is more conservative than defining adoption year as the first year that a hospital says it 
offers a given service, but it minimizes sporadic reporting errors.  Since the data series started in 
1990, if a hospital reports having a given service in both 1990 and 1991, then the adoption year 
would be 1990.  Consequently, all hospitals that have offered a given service before 1990 would 
have an adoption year of 1990.  Exit years are defined using the following logic: (1) there must 
be an adoption year between 1990 and 2002; (2) exit year is the year after the last year in which 
the hospital offers a given service. Because I use the more conservative adoption definition, the 
earliest exit occurs in 1992. 
HMO Penetration Variables.  I define overall HMO penetration as total HMO 
enrollment divided by the total population in an individual MSA. MSA is the common market 
definition used in antitrust analysis of health insurance geographic markets (Hymen and 
Kovacic, 2004).   I categorize hospitals according to whether they operated in MSAs with low 
(<15% of population is enrolled in HMO), medium (15-25%), and high levels of HMO 
penetration (>25%).  The categorical variables allow for a more intuitive interpretation of the 
hazard ratio of service shut down.  The categorical variables can also capture potential non-
linearity in the effects of HMO penetration rates.  
For this analysis, I categorize HMO markets based on the average HMO penetration of a 
given MSA over the entire analysis period.  I take this approach instead of using the actual HMO   11 
penetration rates in each year for the following reasons.  One concern is that HMO plans might 
selectively choose to enter a particular provider market that would give them the best market 
advantages, and therefore the relationship between HMO growth and hospital service offer 
decisions are endogenously related.  I use the average HMO penetration rate as an exogenous 
proxy for the actual and expected HMO market shares during this period.  The idea is that areas 
that had high average HMO penetration in earlier years also tended to have high growth in 
markets in later years (Baker and Phibbs, 2002).  In an alternative specification, I use the peak 
year’s HMO penetration (1999) instead of the average HMO penetration rates (Shen and 
Melnick 2004).  It turned out that those two measures are highly correlated (correlation above 
0.90) and results are similar.  Using this approach also avoids the rare situation in which the 
same hospital might appear in medium HMO market in one year but high HMO market in 
another.  One can think of the HMO categories I use based on average or peak year penetration 
rate as instruments for the actual growth rates in the HMO industry.  Using this definition and the 
cutoff described above, 23% of the hospital sample is in low HMO markets, 39% of the hospital 
sample is in medium HMO market, and the remaining 38% of the hospital sample is in high 
HMO markets.   
For my second research question, I add additional information about which ownership 
dominates a particular HMO market.  I define percent for-profit as the number of enrollees in 
for-profit HMO plans divided by total HMO enrollment in an MSA.  Like the HMO penetration 
measure, I also use the average for-profit share of HMO between 1994 and 2003 to construct the 
three levels of for-profit HMO categories.   Using the average for-profit HMO share has an 
additional benefit for this analysis: it allows me to utilize all years of service data instead of just 
1994 to 2003.   The assumption is that MSAs with high for-profit HMO presence in later part of   12 
1990s also have high for-profit presence in the early 1990s.  I believe this is a reasonable 
assumption because such high correlation does exist in the overall HMO penetration measure.  
The cutoff points for low, medium, and high for-profit HMO markets are 0-50%, 50-90%, and 
>90%, respectively.  About 36%, 21%, and 43% of hospitals are in low, medium, and high for-
profit HMO markets, respectively.  
Other Hospital and Market Variables. I include the following hospital measures in the 
model: hospital ownership (for-profit and government vs. not-for-profit), teaching hospital, 
hospital system membership, casemix of the patient population, size of the hospital (both 
inpatient discharges and outpatient visits), and competitiveness (measured by Herfindahl index).  
The hospital Herfindahl index is constructed using a variable-radius approach based on patient 
flow (Bamezai et al 1999).  I include the following area characteristics: share of hospitals within 
15-mile radius that is for-profit, share of hospitals within 15-mile radius that is owned by 
government, cost of living (as proxy by wage index) of the hospital’s MSA, per capita income 
and population size of MSAs.  
 
Estimating Proportional Hazard Models 
I analyze the hazard of shutting down each service separately using proportional hazard 
models.  My analytical plan consists of two parts.  I first establish the effect of overall HMO 
penetration on the risk of hospital service shut down.  I then examine the effect of for-profit 
HMO level on service shut down risks separately for low, medium, and high HMO markets.  As 
Figure 2 shows, the distribution of for-profit share of HMOs vary considerably across the three 
categories of HMO markets.  The separate analysis in the second part would allow me to capture   13 
potential differential provider behaviors when downward financial pressures from HMO are 
different. The unit of observation is the hospital.  
The Cox (1972) proportional hazard framework is the natural choice to examine rate of exit 
(Cox 1972; Shen 2002).  It is nonparametric therefore I do not have to assume a priori whether 
service survival rate has a positive or negative dependence on time.  Contrary to the study of 
technology adoption where all hospitals are at risk of adopting a technology before the first year 
of study period, only those who have adopted a service in prior years are at risk of dropping that 
service.  Specifically, all hospitals that already offered the service by 1990 will enter the model 
in 1990.  If a hospital did not adopt a service until 1994, then it does not enter the hazard model 
until 1994.  If a hospital never offered a service, then it is not included in the model. 
Another difference from studies of technology adoption is the type of proportional hazard 
model used in this analysis. Previous studies have used discrete time proportional hazard models 
(Cutler and McClellan 1996; Baker and Phibbs 2002). I use the Cox proportional hazard models 
instead of the discrete time proportional hazard models (proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler 
1978) for the exit analysis for several reasons.  First, the Cox proportional hazard model allows 
for more flexible specifications of the baseline hazard (both nonparametric or parametric). 
Second, discrete-time proportional hazard models can be very sensitive to starting values, and a 
small change in model specifications often resulted in no convergence of the maximum 
likelihood function.  In the results section, I will show that for the main model, the results are 
virtually identical between the two approaches.  Therefore I use the Cox models so we can 
compare key coefficients across all sensitivity analyses.  I discuss other sensitivity specifications 
in the results section.   14 
 In the proportional hazard framework, I define 12 intervals during which I can observe 
service exit.  Suppose a hospital adopted a given service in year t0, then intervals (t0, t2] , (t2, t3], 
(t3, t4], and so on capture hospitals that offered a given service in the beginning year of that 
interval but dropped the service by the end year of the interval.  Hospitals that adopted the 
service during the study period but did not drop such a service at the end of 2003 are censored at 
2003.  Note that for hospitals that adopted a given service after 1990, there will be fewer than 12 
intervals.  The probability that hospital i drops service j given that service j was offered up until 
time t is described by the following hazard function, 
  
 ij(t):  
  
Prob(i
th hospital exits service j in year t |offered service j until t)
=exp(-( 1jHMOi +  2jOWNERit +  3jXit)) 0 j(t)
    (1) 
where 
  
 0 j(t) is the baseline hazard rate for service j, which differs by the four Census regions;   
HMOi= indicators for whether hospital i is in MSAs with low, medium, or high levels of 
HMO penetration rates, where the categorical HMO variable is based on the 
average HMO penetration between 1990-2003; 
OWNERit=hospital ownership category (not-for-profit, for-profit, government) and 
whether ownership was ever converted between 1990-2003; 
Xit=A vector of other hospital and market characteristics; 
The associated survival function at time t is given by: 
  
Sij(t) = exp(   ij(u)du)
t0
t    
The coefficient of interest is β1j, as it captures the effect of HMO penetration on the hazard of 
exit for the j
th service.  A positive and statistically significant β1j would indicate that higher HMO 
penetration is associated with higher hazard of service exit.  The coefficients can be estimated by 
applying maximum likelihood method to the Cox partial likelihood function for the above hazard   15 
function. I allow the baseline hazard rate to vary by the four Census regions. I also adjust the 
standard error to account for clustering at the MSA level.  In presenting the results, I use hazard 
ratio instead of the actual coefficient  for ease of interpretation: a statistically significant hazard 
ratio above one indicates higher risk of service exit in high HMO market, for example, compared 
to the low HMO market (the reference group).  Conversely, a hazard ratio below one indicates a 
lower risk of exit compared to the reference group. 
One key assumption of the proportional hazard model is that the hazard ratio is constant 
over time.  In other words, the hazard ratio of service exit between high and low HMO markets is 
a fixed proportion and does not vary by time.  In order to capture possible differential effects 
over time, I add interaction terms between the HMO variable and period indicators for 1995-
1999 and 2000-2003, with 1990-1994 being the base period.  The three periods roughly 
correspond to the booming, the maturing, and the backlash periods of HMO market (Shen and 
Melnick 2006).  
To analyze the second question, whether a predominantly for-profit HMO market would 
exacerbate or mitigate service shut down, I modify eq (1) as follows: 
  
Prob(i
th hospital exits service j in year t |offered service j until t)
=exp(-( 1jHMOi





FP= Indicators for whether hospital i is in MSAs with low, medium, or high share 
of for-profit HMO plans. 
Note that the variable HMOi drops out because I analyze for-profit HMO effect separately for 
low, medium, and high HMO markets.  The key coefficient of interest, β1, captures the effect of 
for-profit HMO penetration on the hazard of service shut down.   I also add interaction terms 
between HMO
FP variable and period indicators.  I discuss other sensitivity analyses   16 
specifications in the results section. 
 
4.  Results 
Descriptive Statistics of HMO Activities and Hospital Characteristics 
  Figure 1 shows the trend of overall HMO penetration from 1990 and 2003.  It started out 
with just under 18 percent of the MSA population enrolled in HMOs in 1990.  The enrollment 
reached peak in 1999 with over 28 percent of the population enrolled in HMO.  There is a slight 
retrenchment of HMO enrollment in the 2000s, with the average penetration in 2003 down to 25 
percent of the population.  The population-weighted average HMO penetration over this period is 
23.5 percent.  Some MSAs have an average of nearly zero penetration rate (such as Casper 
Wyoming, Albany Georgia), while others have an average penetration rate of over 50 percent 
(such as San Francisco, Oakland California, and Rochester New York).  The average HMO 
penetration rates for low, medium, and high HMO markets are 8 percent, 19 percent, and 34 
percent, respectively. 
  The level and growth of for-profit HMO vary by the three types of HMO markets (Figure 2).  
For-profit expansion is fastest in low HMO markets: for-profit share of the market grew from 
just under 60 percent to over 80 percent between 1994 and 2003.  On the contrary, in the high 
HMO markets, the for-profit share of the HMO market remained constant around 50 percent of 
the market share through out the period.  The average for-profit market share across time 
between 1994 and 2003 are 76 percent, 70 percent, and 50 percent for low, medium, and high 
HMO areas, respectively. 
  I summarize hospital and market characteristics by the three levels of HMO penetration in 
Table 1.  As the number of observation shows, each HMO market category contains   17 
approximately 1/3 of the hospital sample.  Hospitals in low HMO markets are less likely to be 
not-for-profit (54 percent) than those in high HMO markets (71 percent).  Hospitals in low HMO 
markets tend to be smaller than those in medium and high HMO markets—they have fewer total 
inpatient discharges and fewer outpatient visits.  Casemix index of patient population is 
comparable across the HMO markets.  In addition, low HMO market is associated with less 
competitive hospital markets.  A Herfindahl index of 1 indicates a monopoly market while a 
nearly zero Herfindahl index indicates a competitive market. The average Herfindahl indices are 
0.34 and 0.26 for low and high HMO markets, respectively.  In terms of market characteristics, 
hospitals in high HMO markets are located in more populated MSAs and have slightly higher 
living costs (wage index is 0.94 and 1.14 for low and high HMO markets, respectively).   
 
Unadjusted Cumulative Survival Probability of Hospital Services 
  Figure 3 shows the cumulative probability of survival for each of the 10 hospital services.  In 
the present context, the survival curve represents the cumulative probability of continuing to 
offer a given service at the end of the time interval.  The survival rate is 100 percent in the 
beginning of the time interval (t0) since that is the year of adoption, and the earliest exit only 
occurs in t2 based on my exit definition described in section 2.  There are 12 time intervals 
except for HIV service and child wellness center which only have 9 intervals. A higher survival 
curve means fewer hospitals drop the service.  An overview of Figures 3A (safety net services) 
and 3B (profitable services) reveals wide variation in survival rate.  In general, safety net 
services have lower survival rate than profitable services, except for emergency department.  The 
probability of survival is relatively high for emergency department—at the end of the 12-year 
interval, the cumulative survival probability is above 0.75.  On the other hand, the cumulative   18 
survival rate of inpatient substance abuse service is only about 0.25 at the end.  Among profitable 
services, fewer hospitals drop birth related services compared to child wellness center and sports 
medicine.  The cumulative survival rate for both maternity care and birthing room are above 0.7 
by the end of the 12-year period. 
Figure 3 also separates out the survival probability of each service by low, medium, and high 
HMO markets.  Among safety net services, there does not appear to be different survival rates 
between high and low HMO markets except for emergency department: hospitals in high HMO 
markets (dotted line) have lower survival rate than those in low and medium HMO markets.   
Outpatient substance abuse service is an interesting case where hospitals in medium HMO 
markets consistently have high survival rate than both low and high HMO markets.  Among 
profitable services, the cumulative survival rates are consistently lower for hospitals in high 
HMO markets except for sports medicine, where there appears to be no difference across the 
HMO markets.  For maternity care and birthing room, the divergence in survival rate between 
low and high HMO markets does not appear until midway through the time series.  The period 
interaction terms in the proportional hazard model would allow me to capture such period effect. 
  
Effect of HMO on the Hazard of Service Exit  
  Figure 3 shows two general trends: the overall survival rates are generally higher for 
profitable services than safety net services; but survival rate differences between low and high 
HMO markets are more pronounced in profitable services.  In this section I present the results 
from the proportional hazard models controlling for hospital and market characteristics. 
  Table 2 presents the effect of overall HMO levels on hazard ratio of service exit. The top 
panel shows the results for overall HMO effect over the entire period, with no period   19 
interactions.  Each column represents a separate regression for each service.  I provide the 
complete regression results of all included variables for each service in the appendix. I use 
hazard ratio to show how levels of HMO penetration are affecting the hazard of shutting down a 
given service.  Take the comparison between hospitals in high and low HMO markets, for 
example.  The hazard ratio is the ratio of the hazard rate between high  and HMO markets, where 
the hazard rate is
 the probability that if service j has not been dropped in year t, it will be dropped 
in year t+1.  The reference group (low HMO markets) has a hazard ratio of 1 by default.  A 
higher hazard ratio indicates that hospitals in high HMO markets have a higher risk of dropping 
the service relative to the reference group.   
Top panel of Table 2 shows that with the assumption of a constant hazard ratio over time, I 
only observe two services where the risk of shutting down is higher in high HMO markets 
compared to low HMO markets.  In particular, the hazard of hospitals in high HMO markets 
shutting down trauma center (child wellness center) is 1.48 (1.74) times higher than the hazard of 
hospitals in low HMO markets dropping such a service.  On the other hand, I observe lower 
hazard of service exit for birth related services in medium and high HMO markets as compared 
to low HMO markets.  For both birthing room and maternity care services, the hazard ratios 
associated with medium and high HMOs are all below 1, and statistically significant at the 0.10 
level for medium HMO markets. 
  I also want to highlight the hazard ratio results of a few hospital characteristics (appendix).  
For-profit hospitals consistently have higher hazard rate of shutting down safety net services than 
not-for-profit hospitals (all hazard ratios are above 1).  The hazard ratio of for-profit ownership 
ranges from 1.05 (emergency department) to 1.47 (HIV/AIDS services) and are statistically 
significant except for emergency services.  On the other hand, the hazard of service exit is   20 
comparable between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals for profitable services (the hazard 
ratio ranges from 0.97 to 1.05).  The only exception is child wellness center, where for-profit 
hospitals have 1.83 times higher hazard of shutting down this service as compared to not-for-
profit hospitals.  Government ownership is generally associated with lower hazard of shutting 
down unprofitable services.  In particular, the hazard ratio of shutting down emergency 
department is 0.62 when comparing government to not-for-profit hospitals.  The hazard rates of 
shutting down profitable services are comparable between government and not-for-profit 
hospitals.  Teaching hospitals have lower hazard rate of shutting down services, regardless of 
whether the service belongs to safety net or profitable category.  The only exception is inpatient 
substance abuse where teaching hospitals are 1.27 times more likely than non-teaching hospitals 
to shut down this service.  Larger hospitals are also less likely to shut down any services—the 
hazard ratio of size variables (outpatient and inpatient visits) are below one for all services.  
Lastly, higher hospital Herfindahl index (i.e., less competitive market) is associated with lower 
hazard rate of shutting down any of the services I examined.  This likely reflects the fact that 
many of the hospitals in those monopolistic markets are the only hospital provider in that market. 
  The top panel of Table 2 indicates little difference in hazard rates of shutting down services 
between hospitals in low and high HMO markets.  In the bottom panel, I estimate the same 
equation but allowing for differential HMO effects by periods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-
2003).  In 1990-1994, the hazard ratios of medium and high HMO markets across services are all 
below one relative to the low HMO markets, indicating that hospitals in low HMO markets have 
the highest exit rates during this period.  In 1995-1999, hospitals in medium HMO markets still 
have much lower risk of shutting down services regardless of their profitability than hospitals in 
low HMO markets. However, the hazard ratios between high and low HMO markets are closer to   21 
one in this period than in the previous period, except for birthing room and sports medicine 
where the hazard ratios remain to be statistically significantly below one.  By 2000-2003, the 
hazard rates of shutting down safety net services are quite comparable between high and low 
HMO markets, except for trauma center: hospitals in high (medium) HMO markets are 2.5 (1.62) 
times more likely to shut down trauma centers than those in low HMO markets.  In the same 
period, hospitals in medium HMO markets all have higher risk of shutting down safety net 
services than those in low HMO markets.  Among profitable services, all hazard ratios are above 
one for medium and high HMO markets in 2000-2003, except for maternity care.  In particular, 
the risks of hospitals in high HMO markets shutting down birthing room, women’s health center 
and child wellness center are 1.57, 1.54 and 2.21 times higher, respectively, than those in low 
HMO markets. 
  To help visualize the HMO effects in Table 2, I graph the predicted survival probability of all 
hospital services in Figure 4.  Specifically, the survival curves in Figure 4 represent the predicted 
survival probability of each service holding all characteristics (except for HMO) at their average 
value.  Therefore the gap between the survival curves in low and high HMO markets can be 
solely attributed to the differences in HMO penetration.   The kinks at t5 and t10 reflect the 
interaction period effects.  For clarity, I omit the survival curves of medium HMO markets.  
Figure 4A shows that trauma center has much lower survival rates in high HMO markets than in 
low HMO markets.  Figure 4B shows that except for maternity care, all other profitable services 
experience a lower survival rate in high HMO markets especially in 2000s. 
 
Effect of For-Profit Share of HMO on the Hazard of Service Exit 
  My next set of analyses investigates the effect of for-profit HMO on the hazard of service   22 
shut down.  As described in section 3, I analyze low, medium, and high HMO markets 
separately.  Table 3 shows the effect of for-profit HMO on service exit rate assuming no change 
in hazard ratios over time.  For sake of brevity, I omit medium HMO markets results in this table 
but can provide the numbers upon request.  The top panel shows that for low HMO markets, 
there is no statistically significant difference in service exit hazard between hospitals in low and 
high for-profit HMO markets, regardless service profitability.  The bottom panel presents the 
hazard ratio for high HMO markets.  Among safety net services, only inpatient substance abuse 
service receives a statistically significant hazard ratio: hospitals in markets with high share of 
for-profit HMO plans are 1.85 times more likely to shut down inpatient substance abuse service 
than those in markets with low share of for-profit plans.  Note that the magnitude of hazard ratio 
of outpatient substance abuse service is also relatively high (1.65) but the smaller sample size 
prevents me from obtaining a more precise standard error estimate.   Among profitable services, 
high FP HMO market is associated with higher risk of shutting down birthing room and sports 
medicine (hazard ratios are 1.8 and 2.06, respectively). 
  Table 4 shows the hazard ratio of for-profit HMO effect by three periods.  Again I only focus 
on low and high HMO markets.  In low HMO markets, the hazard rates of service exit in markets 
with medium and high for-profit HMO in general tend to be lower than those in markets with 
low for-profit share of HMO during 1990-1994.  The hazard of shutting down substance abuse 
and HIV/AIDS services increases over time.  By 2000-2003, the hazard of shutting down 
inpatient substance abuse and HIV/AIDS services are 2 times higher in markets with high for-
profit HMO share compared to those in markets with low for-profit HMO market share.  Among 
profitable services, hazard ratio also increases by 2000-2003, but none of the results are 
statistically significant. The magnitude of the hazard ratio for birthing room and sports medicine   23 
is not small (1.86 and 1.40 for high for-profit HMO markets, respectively), but the smaller 
sample size prevents me from obtaining more precise estimates. 
In high HMO markets, I observe more pronounced period differential of the for-profit HMO 
effect on service shut down.  Among safety net services, hospitals in high for-profit HMO 
markets in general have higher hazard of shutting down services than those in low for-profit 
HMO markets, especially toward the later period.   For example, the risks of shutting down 
substance abuse service (both inpatient and outpatient) between hospitals in high and low for-
profit HMO markets are comparable in 1990-1994.  By 2000-2003, hospitals in high for-profit 
HMO markets are more than 2 times likely to shut down these services than those in low for-
profit HMO markets.  Likewise for trauma center where the corresponding hazard ratio increases 
from 0.56 in 1990-1994 to 3.42 in 200-2003.  Among profitable care, the hazard ratio of shutting 
down services are all below one for high for-profit HMO markets for 1990-1994.  For maternity 
care and child wellness center, the hazard ratios remain close to one by 2000-2003, but for the 
other profitable services, the hazard ratios increase substantially.  The hazard of shutting down 
birthing room, women’s health center, and sports medicine are 3.05, 2.09, and 4.06, respectively, 
times higher in markets with high for-profit share of HMO than in markets with low for-profit 
share of HMO. 
Figure 5 presents the predicted survival rate of safety net services.  Similar to Figure 4, these 
are predicted cumulative survival probability assuming all other characteristics take on the 
average value.  Figure 5A and 5B show the predicted survival curves for low HMO markets and 
high HMO markets, respectively.  In both markets, substance abuse care services have much 
lower survival rates in markets with high for-profit share of HMO, but the survival gap is bigger 
in high HMO markets. Trauma center in markets with high for-profit share of HMO also suffers   24 
a lower survival rate in the later period.  Figure 6 shows the same information for profitable 
services.  Figure 6A shows that in low HMO areas, there is little difference between high and 
low for-profit HMO markets.  Figure 6B shows that in high HMO areas, except for maternity 
care, all other profitable services have much lower survival rate in markets with high for-profit 
share of HMO than markets with low for-profit share. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
  As an alternative proxy for actual HMO growth, I also experiment with using peak year 
HMO penetration instead of the average HMO penetration over this period to classify hospitals 
into different HMO and for-profit HMO markets.  The magnitude of the hazard ratios is very 
similar whether I use peak year or average HMO penetration rates (results available upon 
request).  This result is not surprising given that the correlation between these two measures is 
over 0.90.   
  I am also concerned with whether the decision to offer and shut down a service depends on 
the availability of such a service in the hospital market in prior years.  The hospital competition 
measure is not service-specific, and a hospital would be less likely to shut down a service if 
historically it is the only provider of that service in that particular market.  In another sensitivity 
analysis, I include number of hospitals offering a given service within 15-mile radius in the 
baseline (i.e., 1990 for all services except for HIV/AIDS service and child wellness center whose 
baseline is 1994). It turned out that the hazard ratio of the baseline service variable is very close 
to one across all services, and therefore the effects of HMO and for-profit HMO stay the same 
(results available upon request). 
  I use Cox proportional hazard model instead of Prentice-Gloeckler proportional hazard   25 
model to allow for more flexible specification of the baseline hazard and sensitivity analyses.  In 
Table 5, I compare the results between the two approaches.  As the comparison shows, the 
coefficients and their significance are extremely similar.   
  The hazard of service shut down might be different between hospitals that were in continuous 
operation and those that were short-lived.  I conduct a sensitivity analysis where I restrict the 
sample to only hospitals that are in operation continuously between 1991 and 2003.
5  I lose about 
a quarter of the hospitals when restricting the sample this way.  However, I only lose 10-20% of 
the observations (depending on the service) because not all excluded hospitals offer a given 
service. I found the hazard ratios are magnified in some cases and similar in others, but the 
qualitative results remain the same (Table 6). For example, when using the whole sample, the 
hazard ratios for maternity care in 1990-1994 period are 0.52 and 0.59 for medium and high 
HMO markets.  In the restricted sample, the corresponding hazard ratios are 0.24 and 0.38.   The 
hazard ratios for women’s health center are 1.59 and 1.52 in 2000-2003 for medium and high 
HMO markets in the whole sample, and the corresponding hazard ratios are 1.78 and 1.62 in the 
restricted sample. 
  In the next set of analyses, I investigate whether the results are driven by differences between 
early and late adopters of the services.  If the timing of adoption varies systematically across the 
three levels of HMO penetration, it would also likely affect the duration of the service.  In this 
case, the results of the HMO effects on service shut down would be confounded with the timing 
of service adoption.  While prior studies showed that higher HMO penetration is associated with 
slower rate of technology adoption (Cutler and Sheiner 1997), it is not clear whether the same 
would apply to safety net or public health services.  In this sensitivity analysis, I include an 
                                                 
5 In my main model, if a hospital closed or dropped out of the AHA survey, it would be censored in the proportional 
hazard model.   26 
“early adopter” indicator that takes on the value of one if hospitals have already adopted a given 
service by the first year of observation.  As Table 7 shows, the hazard ratios on medium and high 
HMO markets remain very similar to the original specification and all the conclusions remain the 
same.  Not surprisingly, early adopter has a lower hazard rate of shutting down any given 
service—this is analogous to the regression toward the mean phenomenon.  
  Another potential source of bias in the coefficient estimates might come from unobserved 
heterogeneity across MSA markets.  If HMO plans selectively enter markets that have high 
propensity to shut down unprofitable services for reasons not captured in the model, my results 
would overstate the effect of high HMO on service shut down. One way to test this hypothesis is 
by modeling the unobserved heterogeneity as a multiplicative additional source of error in the 
shut down equation (Baker and Phibbs 2001; Cleves et al 2004).  In other words, the hazard 
function in eq (1) above is modified as follows for hospital i offering service j in market m: 
  
 ijm(t) = exp(xij  j) 0 j(t) m 
where αm varies by MSA. One can think of this approach as a random-effects Cox proportional 
hazard model.  For computational convenience, αm is assumed to be gamma distributed with 
mean of one and variance of θ.  The estimate of θ allows me to test the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity: if θ is zero, the random-effect Cox model reverts to the standard Cox model.  I 
show the value of θ and the log-likelihood test for unobserved heterogeneity at the bottom of 
Table 2.  In most cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity across markets.  In two services where there is evidence of unobserved 
heterogeneity (maternity care and birthing room), the coefficients on our key variables are very 
similar to Table 2 and all our conclusions remain the same (coefficient results available upon 
request).   27 
  Lastly, I consider the implication of using only HMO penetration measure when there are 
other types of managed care that also compete for provider business.  In this set of analyses, I use 
a noisy overall managed care penetration to classify MSAs instead of using the more reliable 
HMO penetration.  This managed care penetration measure includes enrollment from HMO and 
PPO (preferred provider organization), the second dominant form of health plans.  As discussed 
in Section 3, there is little reliable data on PPO penetration.  I have 1992, 1995, and 2003 PPO 
penetration from two different sources (see Shen and Melnick 2004 for more details).  I construct 
the average overall managed care penetration over this period in the following steps.  First, I 
obtain the average PPO penetration across the three available years for each MSA.  Second, I add 
this average PPO penetration to the average HMO penetration I used earlier to obtain the average 
overall managed care penetration.
6  The mean average managed care penetration rate is 54 
percent.  I divide hospitals into low, medium, and high managed care markets where the cutoff 
points of managed care penetration rates are 0-40%, 40-60%, and >60%.  Percent of hospitals 
that fall into each managed care category is 25 percent, 48 percent, and 28 percent. 
Table 8 shows that for safety net services, the results are remarkably similar to the main 
model: hospitals in low managed care markets started out having the highest hazard of shutting 
down safety net services in 1990-1994, but the hazard rates increased over time in medium and 
high managed care markets.  Like the main analysis, by 2000-2003, trauma center stood out as 
having the highest hazard ratio (close to 2) in medium and high managed care markets compared 
to low managed care markets.  Among profitable services, results are also similar except for 
child wellness center: the hazard ratio in 2000-2003 is much lower for the comparison between 
high and low managed care markets.  The similar results between using HMO and using overall 
                                                 
6 I consider this managed care measure noisier than the HMO measure because I only have 3 years of PPO data to 
summarize the PPO market and the data are less reliable than HMO data (personal communication with Interstudy 
representative).   28 
managed care penetration to classify markets are not too surprising, since markets with higher 
HMO activities also tend to have higher penetration of PPO.  Among hospitals that were 
classified in low HMO markets, only 4 hospitals got classified into high managed care markets 
when we add PPO and HMO information together; among hospitals that were classified as in 
high HMO markets, only 3 were classified into low managed care markets. 
 
5.  Discussions 
This paper begins with the research question, does higher HMO penetration lead to higher 
risks of shutting down specialized services in hospitals?  I started out with two competing 
hypotheses.  If economies of scale is the key to reduce hospital cost, then we might see safety 
services being shut down to make room for more profitable services when facing financial 
pressure from HMO plans.  If economies of scope is the key to attract demand from health plans, 
then we might see hospitals adding new services to complement its existing ones and observe no 
difference in exit rates across HMO markets.  The empirical results, however, do not fit neatly 
into either hypothesis, as I find the risk of shut down shifts over time.  Specifically, hospitals in 
medium and high HMO markets started out having lower hazard of shutting down services in 
1990-1994 (especially in the area of profitable services) than those in low HMO markets, but 
their hazard rates increased over time.  By 2000-2003, hospitals in medium and high HMO 
markets ended up with higher risk of shutting down profitable services than those in low HMO 
markets and comparable hazard rates of shutting down safety net services except for trauma 
center. 
One possible explanation is that economy of scope was at work during the early 1990s, when 
hospitals in higher HMO markets would try to attract the booming HMO industry by keeping a   29 
diverse set of services, while hospitals in low HMO markets have less incentive to do so.  
Resource allocation is another possible explanation.  During the early 1990s, hospitals in low 
HMO markets had higher propensity to adopt expensive cardiac and imaging technology, and 
might have to shut down safety net and public health services to make resources available to 
adopt those technologies.  As HMO expanded in the second half of 1990s and the financial 
pressure from HMO grew stronger, hospitals in high HMO markets responded to such financial 
pressure by shutting down selective services, as well as being slow adopters of expensive 
technology.  This explanation is consistent with what’s being observed in the health care 
technology adoption literature.  Prior studies generally found that higher HMO penetration is 
associated with slower technology adoption rates in the 1990s due to the increasing financial 
pressure from HMO.  It is worth noting that when comparing high and low HMO markets, I 
observe higher probability of shut down among profitable services than among safety net 
services in the 2000-2003 period.  Perhaps community pressure keeps safety net services from 
being shut down in high HMO markets.  
The managed care backlash in the 2000s is supposed to alleviate the financial pressure from 
HMOs on providers (Shen and Melnick 2006).  However, I find the survival gap between low 
and high HMO markets to be larger in this period than in the 1990s.  This is likely due to the fact 
that the magnitude of retrenchment is not uniform across the three types of markets.  The average 
HMO growth rate between 1999-2003 is -20% for low HMO markets but only -8% and -11% for 
medium and high HMO markets.  The increasing gap in financial pressure from HMO between 
the high and low markets might contribute to the increasing hazard of service shut down in high 
HMO markets after 2000. 
My second research question explores whether the risks of shutting down services vary by   30 
whether hospitals operate in HMO markets that are predominantly for-profit.  I do not find the 
hazard of shutting down services to differ by levels of for-profit HMO share in low HMO 
markets except for HIV/AIDS and inpatient substance abuse services. I find higher for-profit 
share of HMO to be associated with higher hazard of service exit for half of the services 
examined in high HMO markets, and the hazard ratios are the highest in 2000-2003.  This is 
consistent with the microeconomics framework which suggests that a predominantly for-profit 
HMO markets is likely to exert greater financial pressure than a HMO market that is 
predominantly not-for-profit.  A prior study found that hospitals in high for-profit HMO markets 
have slower cost growth than those in low for-profit HMO markets, and the difference is 
especially evident in high HMO markets (Shen and Melnick 2004).   Taking together, this would 
suggest that some of the cost growth reduction might be achieved by shutting down services, and 
that hospitals in predominantly for-profit HMO markets experience greater HMO financial 
pressure than those in predominantly not-for-profit HMO markets.  Like results to the first 
research question, the higher hazard ratios of exit in for-profit HMO markets do not occur only 
in safety net services, but also in profitable services.  
Although not the focus of this paper, I want to highlight the role of hospital ownership in 
affecting service shut down.  I find that the hazard rate of shutting down profitable services is 
comparable among not-for-profit, for-profit, and government hospitals, while the hazard of 
shutting down safety net services is the highest in for-profit hospitals and lowest in government 
hospitals.  This finding is consistent with the common theoretical framework that frequently 
posits that not-for-profit firms have an objective function different from that of profit 
maximization and that government hospitals often serve as last resort hospitals  (Sloan 2000).  
An important area I did not explore is the potential spillover effect of hospital for-profit   31 
ownership.  As Kessler and McClellan (2002) pointed out, spillover effects might be much more 
important than the direct ownership effect, since for-profit hospitals account for less than 20 
percent of the market share.  Exploring this spillover effect on service shut down should be an 
interesting and important future work. 
These results are robust under different sensitivity analyses, and the overall conclusion 
remains the same when I use a noisier overall managed care penetration measure in place of the 
more accurately measured HMO penetration rates.  However, readers should keep in mind 
several limitations in the empirical methods.  First, the service measures are self-reported by 
hospitals and the attrition rate of AHA survey has deteriorated over the years.  While such a 
noisy dependent variable is a cause of concern, as long as the reporting errors and attrition rates 
do not vary systematically across the HMO markets, my estimates should not be biased.  Second, 
although HMOs continue to be the biggest type of managed care plans, its dominance has 
diminished over the years as more PPO and plans of other arrangements entered the market.  
Even though results remain robust when I use a noisy managed care measure that includes HMO 
and PPO, that measure still does not capture all types of managed care plans.  Third, to the extent 
that service adoption and shut-down decisions are endogenously related to HMO growth, I 
mitigate this concern by using average HMO penetration over the period to classify MSAs 
instead of using the actual HMO penetration for each year.  In addition, the coefficients on the 
key variables are very stable even when I assume there exists unobserved heterogeneity across 
markets.  However, some omitted variable bias might still remain under this approach. 
With these caveats in mind, these results suggest that most safety net services are not in 
worse danger of being shut down in high HMO markets.  This is certainly comforting news for 
low-income population, as they are the major users of these services.  But we should not ignore   32 
the fact that although the hazard of shutting down safety services are not different across the 
HMO markets in the current environment, the overall survival rate of these services, with 
emergency department being the exception, are substantially lower than that of more profitable 
services.  The high exit rates of substance abuse and HIV/AIDS services are problematic given 
the nature of the treatment: disrupting substance abuse care, for example, could have much worse 
consequence on the affected patient population than shutting down sports medicine.  For services 
where I observe a substantially higher rate of exit among hospitals in high HMO markets in the 
current environment (such as trauma center, women’s health center, and child wellness center), 
future work should consider the patient welfare consequences and policy implications of exodus 
of these services.   
The results also highlight the role of ownership in service provision.  Through a combination 
of conversions by not-for-profit health plans to for-profit status, acquisitions of not-for-profit’s 
by for-profit companies and internal growth, the share of total HMO enrollment in for-profit 
health plans is now over 60% in many parts of the US.  Results from this paper suggest that 
hospitals in those markets have higher risk of shutting down safety net and public health 
services.  Moreover, for-profit hospitals have higher propensity to shut down unprofitable 
services.  The potential disruption of care is an important aspect state regulators should take into 
consideration when evaluating ownership conversions in health care markets.       33 
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 1990-2003 Average
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not-for-profit 54% 41% 75% 30% 71% 32%
For-profit 24% 42% 14% 35% 17% 38%
Government 22% 41% 10% 30% 12% 32%
Ownership converted during 1990-
2003
21% 41% 16% 37% 20% 40%
Teaching 7% 25% 13% 33% 12% 32%
System membership 59% 47% 59% 46% 64% 44%
Herfindahl index 0.34 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.26 0.09
Casemix index 1.37 0.24 1.37 0.22 1.37 0.22
Total discharges 9038 8232 10299 8776 11356 157459
Total outpatients 113858 137965 143499 162495 124930 147526
Wage index 0.94 0.12 1.07 0.18 1.14 0.17
MSA population              605,688               851,993               2,427,901               2,509,900               3,121,351               2,670,361 
Per capita income 21785 5695 26586 9455 26565 7859
Percent FP hospitals within 15 mile 
radius
15% 20% 10% 15% 14% 18%
Percent government hospitals within 
15-mile radius
10% 15% 6% 10% 7% 11%
Number of observations 9783 12673 10704
Low HMO markets Medium HMO markets High HMO Markets

















Low HMO Markets 
(reference group)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Medium HMO markets 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.80 1.11 0.78 0.73+ 0.85 1.16 0.95
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.89 0.96 0.94 1.06 1.48* 0.88 0.93 1.01 1.74** 0.81
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.32) (0.13)
By Periods
1990-1994
Medium HMO markets 0.65* 0.58* -- 0.65 0.80 0.52* 0.49** 0.52* -- 0.84
(0.14) (0.12) -- (0.20) (0.24) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) -- (0.17)
High HMO markets 0.84 0.78 -- 0.81 0.69 0.66 0.66+ 0.79 -- 0.60*
(0.18) (0.14) -- (0.26) (0.22) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19) -- (0.13)
1995-1999
Medium HMO markets 0.83 0.81 0.64* 0.50* 0.71+ 0.65* 0.46** 0.54** 0.87 0.74+
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.94 0.88 0.81 1.18 0.99 0.93 0.70+ 0.82 1.22 0.63*
(0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.26) (0.23) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.25) (0.13)
2000-2003
Medium HMO markets 1.30 1.41+ 1.08 1.32 1.62** 1.13 1.41 1.61* 1.47* 1.41+
(0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.34) (0.27) (0.25) (0.36) (0.31) (0.28) (0.25)
High HMO markets 0.89 1.28 1.07 1.13 2.50** 0.96 1.57+ 1.54* 2.21** 1.29
(0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.29) (0.51) (0.22) (0.39) (0.31) (0.46) (0.23)
Testing for H0: no unobserved heterogeneity across MSA markets (theta=0)
estimated theta 0.058 <0.001 <0.001 0.039 0.28 0.087 0.073 <0.001 <0.001 0.039
probability of not 
rejecting H0
0.10 0.50 0.50 0.17 0.29 0.02 0.05 0.50 0.50 0.17
Observations 5707 8713 8462 26497 8172 20412 20732 14801 4087 10537
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Baseline hazard rate varies by 4 Census regions
Complete regression results are available in Appendix





















Low FP share of HMO 
(reference group)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Medium FP share of HMO 1.27 1.12 0.90 0.77 0.82 0.81 1.04 0.66 0.84 1.15
(0.42) (0.36) (0.29) (0.26) (0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.24) (0.34) (0.35)
High FP share of HMO 1.33 0.96 1.11 0.55 0.86 0.74 1.03 0.86 0.75 0.99
(0.42) (0.32) (0.32) (0.21) (0.34) (0.33) (0.39) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Observations 1706 2227 2779 7653 2522 5988 6107 4391 1054 3202
High HMO Markets
Low FP share of HMO 
(reference group)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Medium FP share of HMO 0.88 1.12 0.95 0.73 0.75 0.69 1.24 0.87 1.14 1.07
(0.26) (0.31) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.16) (0.29) (0.22) (0.29) (0.33)
High FP share of HMO 1.85* 1.65 0.84 1.04 1.46 0.90 1.80** 1.11 0.80 2.06*
(0.46) (0.53) (0.16) (0.26) (0.35) (0.26) (0.37) (0.21) (0.23) (0.64)
Observations 1505 2479 2519 8044 2220 6016 6078 4308 1118 2867
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%






















Medium FP HMO share 0.74 0.77 -- 0.24+ 0.95 0.80 0.27+ 0.61 -- 0.36
(0.40) (0.37) -- (0.20) (0.72) (0.58) (0.20) (0.40) -- (0.27)
High FP HMO share 0.85 0.53+ -- 1.32 0.99 0.59 0.60 1.03 -- 0.99
(0.35) (0.20) -- (0.81) (0.59) (0.39) (0.28) (0.45) -- (0.39)
1995-1999
Medium FP HMO share 1.38 0.93 0.84 0.74 0.55 0.76 1.31 0.55 0.77 1.22
(0.52) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.27) (0.36) (0.57) (0.27) (0.34) (0.42)
High FP HMO share 1.10 0.92 0.83 0.32* 0.43 0.69 0.93 0.41* 0.48 0.74
(0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.15) (0.26) (0.32) (0.40) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23)
2000-2003
Medium FP HMO share 1.64 1.86 2.27 1.13 0.96 0.87 1.61 0.80 1.02 1.86
(0.72) (0.82) (1.14) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.88) (0.35) (0.48) (0.71)
High FP HMO share 2.37* 1.62 2.17+ 0.71 1.03 0.88 1.86 1.36 1.01 1.40
(0.83) (0.67) (0.91) (0.32) (0.42) (0.41) (0.81) (0.52) (0.40) (0.45)
High HMO Markets
1990-1994
Medium FP HMO share 0.88 1.15 -- 0.62 0.54 0.55 1.19 0.43* -- 0.60
(0.26) (0.36) -- (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.15) -- (0.26)
High FP HMO share 1.25 1.35 -- 0.18** 0.56 0.22 0.77 0.49* -- 0.97
(0.65) (0.44) -- (0.05) (0.42) (0.27) (0.39) (0.16) -- (0.45)
1995-1999
Medium FP HMO share 0.63 0.87 0.65 0.68 0.37* 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.54+ 0.79
(0.21) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27)
High FP HMO share 2.24* 1.40 1.10 1.40 0.81 1.11 1.65* 0.99 0.86 2.02+
(0.74) (0.76) (0.30) (0.41) (0.22) (0.43) (0.36) (0.28) (0.28) (0.79)
2000-2003
Medium FP HMO share 1.84 1.61 1.17 0.94 1.34 0.68 2.25* 1.61 1.86* 2.18**
(0.87) (0.53) (0.41) (0.36) (0.45) (0.21) (0.72) (0.50) (0.52) (0.63)
High FP HMO share 2.68+ 2.63** 1.00 1.19 3.42** 0.91 3.05** 2.09* 0.81 4.06**
(1.38) (0.96) (0.34) (0.50) (1.06) (0.33) (1.11) (0.61) (0.30) (1.39)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Baseline hazard rate varies by 4 Census regions
















Using Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) Discrete Time Proportional Hazard Model
1990-1994
Medium HMO markets 0.69+ 0.55** -- 0.60+ 0.84 0.45** 0.42** 0.53* -- 0.80
(0.16) (0.11) -- (0.18) (0.25) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) -- (0.16)
High HMO markets 0.94 0.75 -- 0.70 0.78 0.63 0.62* 0.77 -- 0.60*
(0.22) (0.14) -- (0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) -- (0.13)
1995-1999
Medium HMO markets 0.80 0.86 0.65* 0.53+ 0.68* 0.65* 0.49** 0.55** 0.86 0.74
(0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.23) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.96 0.95 0.89 1.05 1.09 0.88 0.66+ 0.86 1.16 0.62*
(0.20) (0.17) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.25) (0.12)
2000-2003
Medium HMO markets 1.25 1.38+ 1.06 1.12 1.70** 1.09 1.44 1.65* 1.52* 1.42+
(0.25) (0.26) (0.21) (0.31) (0.30) (0.25) (0.39) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27)
High HMO markets 0.81 1.26 1.00 1.33 2.34** 0.97 1.78* 1.60* 2.36** 1.28
(0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.31) (0.53) (0.24) (0.43) (0.31) (0.52) (0.23)
Using Cox (1972) Proportional Hazard Model
1990-1994
Medium HMO markets 0.70 0.57** -- 0.66 0.86 0.50** 0.47** 0.55* -- 0.81
(0.15) (0.12) -- (0.19) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) -- (0.16)
High HMO markets 0.95 0.78 -- 0.75 0.78 0.68 0.63+ 0.77 -- 0.59*
(0.21) (0.14) -- (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.15) (0.18) -- (0.13)
1995-1999
Medium HMO markets 0.81 0.85 0.67* 0.54* 0.70+ 0.68* 0.51** 0.56** 0.88 0.76
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.99 1.07 0.88 0.66+ 0.79 1.19 0.61*
(0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.24) (0.12)
2000-2003
Medium HMO markets 1.29 1.39+ 1.05 1.14 1.60** 1.10 1.36 1.60* 1.45+ 1.41+
(0.24) (0.25) (0.20) (0.30) (0.27) (0.24) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.25)
High HMO markets 0.86 1.26 1.00 1.32 2.26** 1.01 1.65* 1.54* 2.20** 1.30
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.29) (0.48) (0.23) (0.40) (0.30) (0.46) (0.23)
Observations 5707 8713 8462 26497 8172 20412 20732 14801 4087 10537
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note:  In order to make the two models comparable, baseline hazard is not fully stratified by Census regions, therefore results of Cox model is slightly different from Table 2.



















Low HMO Markets 
(reference group)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Medium HMO markets 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.70 1.01 0.74 0.69 0.90 1.14 1.00
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.23) (0.16)
High HMO markets 0.88 0.98 0.89 0.70 1.45+ 0.76 0.79 0.94 1.69* 0.80
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.27) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36) (0.14)
By Periods
1990-1994
Medium HMO markets 0.57* 0.47** -- 0.33* 0.70 0.24** 0.32** 0.55+ -- 0.80
(0.16) (0.13) -- (0.18) (0.24) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19) -- (0.22)
High HMO markets 0.99 0.77 -- 0.26* 0.72 0.38+ 0.47* 0.56+ -- 0.58+
(0.22) (0.16) -- (0.14) (0.23) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) -- (0.18)
1995-1999
Medium HMO markets 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.23** 0.61* 0.58* 0.37** 0.45** 0.74 0.74
(0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) (0.14)
High HMO markets 0.92 0.86 0.84 0.53+ 0.79 0.81 0.41** 0.61* 1.13 0.57**
(0.20) (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.25) (0.23) (0.12) (0.15) (0.28) (0.12)
2000-2003
Medium HMO markets 1.25 1.55* 1.02 1.26 1.54* 1.19 1.48 1.78* 1.52* 1.53*
(0.24) (0.30) (0.20) (0.43) (0.32) (0.32) (0.49) (0.42) (0.32) (0.30)
High HMO markets 0.76 1.36 1.23 1.06 2.51** 0.92 1.53 1.62* 2.09** 1.32
(0.21) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.51) (0.26) (0.43) (0.37) (0.49) (0.25)
Observations 4621 7307 7375 22043 7229 17664 17957 12642 3673 9068
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Baseline hazard rate varies by 4 Census regions
Table 6. The Effect of Overall HMO on Hazard Ratio of Service Exit 

















Medium HMO markets 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.80 1.16 0.79 0.74 0.89 1.17 0.97
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.95 0.99 1.04 1.02 1.56* 0.84 0.87 1.04 1.67** 0.85
(0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.29) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.31) (0.14)
Early adopter indicator 0.64** 0.55** 0.63** 0.47** 0.60** 0.51** 0.56** 0.48** 0.51**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
By Periods
1990-1994
Medium HMO markets 0.81 0.75 -- 0.83 1.10 0.67 0.62+ 0.65 -- 1.14
(0.18) (0.16) -- (0.29) (0.34) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) -- (0.24)
High HMO markets 1.09 1.01 -- 1.01 0.96 0.76 0.80 0.89 -- 0.86
(0.25) (0.19) -- (0.39) (0.31) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) -- (0.21)
1995-1999
Medium HMO markets 0.85 0.85 0.71+ 0.50* 0.75 0.69+ 0.48** 0.56** 1.06 0.76
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.27) (0.13)
High HMO markets 1.01 0.90 0.91 1.19 1.05 0.96 0.69+ 0.85 1.45+ 0.68+
(0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.28) (0.25) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.32) (0.14)
2000-2003
Medium HMO markets 1.11 1.19 1.12 1.13 1.49* 0.96 1.17 1.46* 1.26 1.17
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.25) (0.20) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.20)
High HMO markets 0.78 1.07 1.16 0.88 2.36** 0.75 1.19 1.39+ 1.82** 1.07
(0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.48) (0.16) (0.29) (0.27) (0.38) (0.19)
Observations 5636 8665 8411 26252 8149 20306 20587 14689 4073 10472
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Baseline hazard rate varies by 4 Census regions
Table 7. The Effect of Overall HMO Penetration on Hazard Ratio of Service Exit

















Low MC Markets 
(reference group)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Medium MC markets 1.03 0.93 0.96 0.95 1.31* 0.88 0.91 0.94 1.22 0.75*
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.09)
High MC markets 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.71 1.00 0.68* 0.68+ 0.87 1.02 0.71*
(0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.10)
By Periods
1990-1994
Medium MC markets 0.82 0.61** -- 0.74 0.95 0.58* 0.57* 0.77 -- 0.72+
(0.14) (0.11) -- (0.23) (0.24) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) -- (0.13)
High MC markets 0.65 0.70+ -- 0.78 0.73 0.47* 0.48** 0.69 -- 0.48**
(0.17) (0.13) -- (0.29) (0.20) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) -- (0.12)
1995-1999
Medium MC markets 1.01 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.79 0.85 0.76 0.64** 0.96 0.61**
(0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17) (0.09)
High MC markets 0.96 0.75 0.65 0.58+ 0.56* 0.68+ 0.44** 0.64* 0.75 0.58**
(0.21) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.11)
2000-2003
Medium MC markets 1.30 1.30+ 1.00 1.19 1.95** 1.09 1.42+ 1.51* 1.46* 1.00
(0.22) (0.20) (0.17) (0.28) (0.32) (0.21) (0.29) (0.26) (0.25) (0.14)
High MC markets 0.90 1.10 1.04 0.86 1.76* 0.84 1.22 1.36+ 1.31 1.06
(0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.39) (0.21) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29) (0.17)
Observations 5598 8625 8353 26120 8123 20234 20507 14631 4053 10415
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The break points for low, medium and high managed care markets are 0-40%, 40-60%, >60%.
Baseline hazard rate varies by 4 Census regions










Medium HMO markets 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.80 1.11
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
High HMO markets 0.89 0.96 0.94 1.06 1.48*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.26)
For-profit ownership 1.27+ 1.29+ 1.47** 1.05 1.31
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.22)
Government ownership 1.17 0.99 0.89 0.62* 0.74
(0.17) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
Ownership converted 1.24+ 1.35** 1.08 1.25 1.16
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16)
Teaching hospital 1.27+ 0.79 0.48** 1.20 0.43**
(0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.31) (0.10)
System membership 1.10 1.02 0.84 1.31 1.35+
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.35) (0.23)
Herfindhal index (log) 1.16 0.68* 0.93 0.79 0.80
(0.21) (0.11) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18)
Case mix index (log) 2.30* 1.90 0.56 1.22 0.67
(0.90) (0.88) (0.27) (0.65) (0.40)
Total inpatient discharges  0.81** 0.86+ 0.78** 0.73** 0.61**
(log) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Total outpatient visits 0.94 0.85** 0.89+ 0.82+ 0.96
(log) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Area wage index 0.45+ 0.42* 0.56 0.68 0.24*
(0.21) (0.18) (0.27) (0.41) (0.15)
MSA population (log) 1.04 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Per capita income (log) 1.57* 1.46+ 1.33 1.17 1.93*
(0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.53)
% FP hospitals within 1.15 1.56 1.02 1.44 0.52
15-mile radius (0.46) (0.48) (0.40) (0.81) (0.24)
% GOV hospitals within 1.46 1.68 1.17 2.63** 2.50+
15-mile radius (0.72) (0.75) (0.57) (0.95) (1.19)
Observations 5707 8713 8462 26497 8172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%










Medium HMO markets 0.78 0.73+ 0.85 1.16 0.95
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13)
High HMO markets 0.88 0.93 1.01 1.74** 0.81
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.32) (0.13)
For-profit ownership 1.01 0.97 1.05 1.83** 1.04
(0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.29) (0.14)
Government ownership 1.11 1.00 1.21 0.96 0.82
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.12)
Ownership converted 0.97 1.28* 1.08 0.97 0.95
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12)
Teaching hospital 0.96 1.02 0.65+ 0.68* 0.88
(0.23) (0.19) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
System membership 1.71** 1.44* 1.15 1.30 1.10
(0.27) (0.23) (0.15) (0.24) (0.13)
Herfindhal index (log) 0.52** 0.54* 0.81 0.81 0.62*
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13)
Case mix index (log) 1.96 1.55 0.78 0.95 0.56
(0.97) (0.88) (0.39) (0.55) (0.22)
Total inpatient discharges  0.52** 0.50** 0.60** 0.78** 0.87
(log) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Total outpatient visits 0.83* 0.87 0.78** 0.85* 0.78**
(log) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Area wage index 0.30* 0.28* 1.75 2.33 0.36+
(0.18) (0.16) (0.76) (1.66) (0.21)
MSA population (log) 1.08 1.15* 1.10+ 0.90+ 1.11*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Per capita income (log) 2.44** 2.10** 1.52* 1.46+ 1.63*
(0.54) (0.51) (0.27) (0.30) (0.38)
% FP hospitals within 1.13 0.66 1.29 0.97 0.63
15-mile radius (0.43) (0.30) (0.48) (0.44) (0.20)
% GOV hospitals within 1.78 2.37* 1.19 1.58 1.69
15-mile radius (0.83) (0.86) (0.46) (0.81) (0.73)
Observations 20412 20732 14801 4087 10537
Appendix. Complete Results of Main Model